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Abstract—The benefits of the ubiquitous caching in
ICN are profound, such features make ICN promis-
ing for content distribution, but it also introduces a
challenge to content protection against the unauthorized
access. The protection of a content against unauthorized
access requires consumer authentication and involves
the conventional end-to-end encryption. However, in
information-centric networking (ICN), such end-to-end
encryption makes the content caching ineffective since
encrypted contents stored in a cache are useless for
any consumers except those who know the encryption
key. For effective caching of encrypted contents in ICN,
we propose a secure distribution of protected content
(SDPC) scheme, which ensures that only authenticated
consumers can access the content. SDPC is lightweight
and allows consumers to verify the originality of the
published content by using a symmetric key encryption.
Moreover, SDPC naming scheme provides protection
against privacy leakage. The security of SDPC was
proved with the BAN logic and Scyther tool verification,
and simulation results show that SDPC can reduce the
content download delay.
Index Terms—Information Centric Networking,
Named Data Networking, 5G, Content Distribution,
Access control, In-network caching, Security,
Authentication, Privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the earliest time of the Internet, its underly-
ing architecture has been based on packet-switching
and host-to-host communications. The TCP/IP layered
architecture employs the same view and provides an
abstract host-to-host communication model to com-
munication applications. It decouples what to com-
municate from how the communication is done. This
basic design feature of the TCP/IP architecture was
far-reaching, allowing the Internet to grow for almost
four decades while adopting various features and yet
maintaining high efficiency. However, in the recent
past there has been a profound increase in Internet
connectivity, and with the emergence of new Internet
applications, the Internet semantics have changed from
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host centric to content centric. To satisfy the needs
of emerging internet applications, the current TCP/IP
Internet architecture has adopted several application
layer solutions known as over-the-top (OTT) applica-
tions, such as content delivery network (CDN), web
caching, and peer-to-peer networking [1], [2]. With the
addition of numerous applications, the gap between the
basic semantics of the current Internet architecture and
its usage is bound to increase; in fact, the additions
of new OTT applications are leading us towards a
very complex Internet architecture, and are introducing
challenges to achieving efficiency, security, and pri-
vacy at acceptable economical cost.
Further, Internet trends are shifting away from
browsing information to online consuming and sharing
all types of content, including user-generated contents.
Hence, the most promising characteristic of the future
Internet is ubiquitous content delivery. What is being
communicated is becoming more important than who
is communicating. In this perspective, information-
centric networking (ICN) has emerged as a promising
architecture for the Future Internet; recently, the ICN
support for 5G use cases were specified by NGMN.
ICN represents a paradigm shift from host-centric
to content-centric services and from source-driven to
receiver-driven approaches. In the ICN paradigm the
network is in charge of doing the mapping between the
requested content and where it can be found. To do so,
a network level naming is used for identifying content
objects, independent of their locations [3]–[5]. This
means that the ICN architecture decouples contents
from the host at the network level and supports a
temporary storage of contents at in-network caches.
In ICN, in-network caching is an integral part of
the ICN service framework [6] [7]. The benefits of the
ubiquitous caching in ICN are profound, but it also
introduces a challenge to content security; especially,
the protection of a private or confidential content is
a challenging task. The ICN enabled cache routers
can store the content segments for future use; hence,
the content is temporarily cached in few intermediate
cache routers while it is being delivered to a consumer.
If content requests traverse a cache router that holds
a temporarily cached copy of that particular content
segment, then the request is entertained locally with-
out being routed towards the publisher. However, in
ICN the publisher has no control over the content
after injecting it in the network; in particular, if a
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private or confidential content is protected insecurely,
then any unauthorized consumer can acquire it from
intermediate caches. Traditionally, the protection of the
content against unauthorized access requires consumer
authentication and involves the conventional end-to-
end encryption. Consequently, when the content is en-
crypted with the authorized user’s key, the in-network
caching becomes ineffective in ICN.
In Figure 1, a publisher P publishes two content
objects Oj and Ok. Further, two consumers NA and
NB subscribe to access these protected contents Oj
and Ok. Furthermore, the object Oj is published
without encrypting, scrambling, or hashing the con-
tent name, while the object Ok is published with
encrypting, scrambling or hashing the content name
to ensure its privacy. Assume that the consumer NA
sent an interest packet IA,j encapsulating the access
authorization information. In reply, based on the sub-
scription information, if NA is a valid subscriber, the
publisher P encrypts the requested content segment
S0,j with a consumer specific key and sends it to the
consumer NA. Based on the semantics of ICN and
cache replacement schemes, the intermediate cache
router R5 stores the encrypted content segment S0,j
for future use. Now lets suppose, the consumer NB
requests the same content. If the meta-data of the
encrypted stored packet is available to R5, as in case
of Oj , then the intermediate cache router R5 will
reply with the cached content S0,j to the consumer
NB . However, NB cannot decrypt the content segment
S0,j as it was solely intended for NA and thus the
payload is encrypted with the key known to P and NA.
Contrarily, if the meta-data of the encrypted stored
packet is unavailable to R5, as in case of Ok, the
interest packet IB,k will be forwarded to the publisher.
This issue can be solved by encrypting each content
segment with a key known to all subscribers. In this
regard, this issue can be viewed as a group key
agreement problem. However, even in the presence of
a perfect key distribution protocol, the assurance of
backward and forward secrecy requires complex oper-
ations since the publisher in ICN has no control over
the content after injecting it in the network. Moreover,
in conventional group key agreement protocols [8],
[9], the hosts share a cryptographic key for secure
communications, which are not well-suited for the
content centric ICN paradigm.
For example, if an authorized consumer unsub-
scribes from the service, then to ensure the forward
secrecy it is necessary to make sure that leaving
consumer don’t have access to future keys for the
group; hence, the shared key should be updated. From
this point onward, the publisher would encrypt new
version of content with updated group keys. To access
the content which is already disseminated in network
caches, the authorized consumers need to keep both
keys for effective cache utilization. As shown in
Figure 1(b), at time t1, the publisher P publishes
Fig. 1. Ineffective caching in ICN with end-to-end encryption.
object Oj and shared the encryption key K1 with all
authorized consumers NA, NB and NC . Let’s assume
at time t2 consumer NB unsubscribe with publisher
P . The publisher P will issue a new key K2. Further
assume that before unsubscribe event the copies of
segment S0,j and S1,j were already disseminated in
ICN core network; now if a consumer NA or NC
request object Oj , it may get S0,j and S1,j from cache
router encrypted with K1 and rest of the segments
from publishers encrypted with K2. Similarly, if a new
authorized consumer subscribes for the service, then to
ensure the backward secrecy the shared key should be
updated, and previous group members need to keep
both keys for effective cache utilization. Imagine a
highly dynamic group where the consumers subscribe
or unsubscribe very frequently, it will trigger numerous
leave and join events, which will invoke group key
agreement protocols each time. For effective caching,
all consumers would keep record of multiple keys.
Moreover, an extra decision operation is required to
select a proper key; associating a time stamp can solve
the problem at the cost of group member synchroniza-
tion. Hence, the conventional group key management
cannot handle the access control problem in ICN for
ensuring the effective caching.
In our proposed scheme, we shifted the central
target of keying process from hosts to data itself, i.e.,
the segments of the published content are encrypted
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with symmetric cryptographic keys that are unique to
each segment and versions. The solution is to encrypt
each content segment with a uniquely assigned key
known to all subscribers; which raises three funda-
mental questions. How does one ensure that only
an authenticated subscribed consumer can access the
content? How can the consumer verify the originality
of the content; that is, do we still need self-certifying?
Finally, and most importantly, how can encryption keys
be distributed among all of the consumers for each
content segment? We answered all these questions in
this work.
Specifically, we propose a secure distribution of
protected content (SDPC) scheme, which consists of
two protocol suites, 1) the keying protocol suite and
2) the subscription and content access protocol suite.
The keying protocol suite enables the consumer and
publisher to share a chain of secret keys required
to decrypt the segments of the published content,
while the subscription and content access protocol
suite ensures that only authorized consumers receive
the secret key generation information.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Sections II and III, we summarize the related works
and present the system model, respectively. Section IV
describes SDPC with detailed discussions. Section V
presents an inclusive security analysis. In Section VI,
we present the performance analysis of SDPC. Finally,
we provide concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Most existing access control schemes for secure
contents are application specific or lack security
strength. For example, in [10], the authors presented
a scheme for protected contents using network coding
as encryption. However, the scheme requires a private
connection between the publisher and consumer to
obtain the decoding matrix and missing data blocks.
In [11], the authors presented a security framework
for the copyrighted video streaming in ICN based
on linear random coding. It is proven that the linear
random coding alone improves the performance of
ICN [12]. However in [11], each video was encrypted
with a large number of symmetric encryption keys,
such that each video frame was encrypted with a
unique symmetric encryption key. Since only autho-
rized users who possessed the set of all keys could
decrypt the video content, the distribution of a large
number of keys for each video content can be an extra
communication overhead.
In earlier work [13], the authors proposed a content
access control scheme for ICN enabled wireless edge.
The proposed one is an extension of [14], which
employs the public-key based algorithm and shamir’s
secret sharing as a building block, named AccConF. To
obtain a unique interpolating polynomial of shamir’s
scheme, AccConF espoused Lagrangian Interpolation
technique. The calculation of Lagrangian Interpolation
is a computationally expensive process. To reduce the
client-side computational burden the publisher piggy
backs an enabling block with each content, which
encapsulates partially solved Lagrangian coefficients.
In work by [15], an access control realized by a
flexible secure content distribution architecture, which
combins the proxy re-encryption and identity-based
encryption mechanisms. The publisher generates a
symmetric key and encrypt the content before dis-
semination. To access the content from in-network
cache or directly from publisher, a consumer first
sends a request to publisher to acquires the symmetric
encryption key. Upon receiving the key request, the
publisher validates and verifies the authenticity of
consumer, and sends the symmetric key encapsulated
in response message encrypted with consumers iden-
tity. The proposed scheme eliminated the asymmetric
encryption, but it is not clear that how the consumers
private identity could be known to the content provider.
In other work [16], author proposed a content
access control scheme based on proxy re-encryption.
In proxy re-encryption the content is re-encrypted
by an intermediate node. In proposed scheme the
edge routers perform the content re-encryption. Upon
receiving a content request, the publisher encrypts
the data and a randomly generated key k1, using its
public key. Upon receiving the content request, edge
router generates a random key k2 encrypted by the
publishers public key and signed by the edge router.
Edge router sends the encrypted k2 to publisher and
appends the encrypted k2 with the content and dispatch
it towards consumer. Meanwhile, the publisher verifies
the authenticity of consumer, and generates the content
decryption key K using K1, K2 and public key. Upon
receiving K the consumer can decrypt the content.
In other work [17], the authors proposed a dis-
tributed information flow control mechanism (named
MCAC) to enable secure access control for the pub-
lished content. In MCAC, the requests and content
objects are labeled with {h, n, d, p}. These labels
classify the contents based on the security and privacy
requirements, where the h-level signifies the highest
protection level and enforces non-caching policy, the
n-level enforces the 1-level caching policy, the d-level
permits multi-level caching policy, and the p-level
supports all reading policy. To administer the MCAC
information flow, the intermediate routers require to
implement a trust computing base (TCB), consists
of three modules; trust storage module (TSM), trust
labeling module (TLM), and trust enforcement module
(TEM). TSM governs the process of cryptographic ses-
sion key establishment between participating routers
and other nodes. The session keys are used to attain
the h-level security by encrypting highly confidential
h labeled contents. TLM checks the label value and
instructs the operating system accordingly to take
further actions. TEM performs the content forwarding
process and is responsible for content reclassification,
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Fig. 2. Illustration of a) system model and b) naming scheme used in SDPC.
i.e., TEM can re-labels a content to the h-level if it
was at the n-level to hide the content based on privacy
policy of the publisher. MCAC does not provide any
mechanism to authenticate participating entities, which
makes MCAC vulnerable to various attack. Moreover,
to enforce the h-level security and privacy protection,
all MCAC enabled routers need to establish a crypto-
graphic session key and need to encrypt/decrypt all
the communication between routers, which severely
effects the performance of MCAC1.
In another study [18], the authors presented an ac-
cess control scheme for the encrypted content in ICN,
which is based on the efficient unidirectional proxy re-
encryption (EU-PRE) proposed by [19]. The proposed
scheme, named efficient unidirectional re-encryption
(EU-RE), simplifies EU-PRE by eliminating the need
of proxies in the re-encryption operation. However, the
EU-RE scheme is still based on asymmetric cryptog-
raphy, which is not suitable for several resource con-
straint applications such as, IoT and sensor networks.
Moreover, the authors made an assumption that the
content provider behaves correctly, i.e., it does not
distribute any private content or decryption rights to
unauthorized users. However, this assumption falsifies
the protocol claims defined in [20], which means EU-
RE is weak against several attacks.2
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model used throughout this work is
shown in Figure 2(a). For concrete discussion and
better understanding, in the rest of the article, we
present SDPC for a particular ICN architecture, i.e.,
named data networking (NDN) [3]. However, SDPC
can be adopted for other ICN architectures without
changing the core idea.
1 To verify the protocol claims, we implemented MCAC in an
automated security protocol analysis tool, Scyther [21], and also
discussed its performance in Sections V and VI.
2To verify the protocol claims, we implemented EU-RE in an au-
tomated security protocol analysis tool, Scyther [21], and presented
the results in Section V.
In NDN core networks, we introduce a new entity,
designated subscription manager M . The subscription
manager M can be a module installed on the publisher
or it could be an independent entity in the network.
In this work we assume that subscription manager
M is an independent entity associated with multiple
publishers. We also assume that there is a secret
number niS associated with each valid subscriber (or
consumer) i, which is registered with the subscription
manager M . The registration could be made offline
or online using a smart mechanism. The subscription
manger M stores the secret number niS in a hash table,
which is a part of registration database, as shown in
Figure 2(a). Note that being registered does not mean
the consumer is entitled to access a certain protected
content. When a registered consumer is interested in a
protected content, the consumer should first subscribe
to the protected content, for instance, subscribing to a
movie channel. In the first step, the consumer sends
an interest request for the protected content along with
the subscription request, and the publisher routes the
request towards the subscription manager M . After
that, the subscription manager M authenticates the
consumer NA and in response the publisher P sends
the encryption key generation information KEYMSG.
Using KEYMSG as a seed for a secure hash function,
the consumer NA and the publisher P can generate
a chain of keys. Then, the publisher P uses these
keys to encrypt the segments of the published content;
likewise, after acquiring KEYMSG the consumer NA
generates the same keys to decrypt the segments of the
published content.
To acquire KEYMSG, the first interest packet sent
by a consumer should reach the publisher. To avoid
any cache hit, it is important the name of the content
should be unique between the consumer and the
publisher, yet it should identify the requested object.
As shown in Figure 2(b), the name of the segment 0,
”korea.ac.kr/∼fil/test.doc/ v1/ s0”, is a variable length
and in a human readable form. However, to avoid any
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cache hit the SDPC naming scheme adopts the name
uniqueness, such that the name of first interest is
unique between consumer and publisher. To, achieve
the name uniqueness the consumer inserts the hash of
the secret number niS , and encrypts the content name
with KiTS . Then, the name of the segment 0 becomes
”korea.ac.kr/∼fil/Hash (niS)/EiTS (test.doc/ v1/ s0)”.
In this naming scheme the insertion of digest and
encryption of naming part provides a consumer-
publisher specific unique name and as a result the
interest packet always reaches the publisher without
any cache hit. Note that the usage of consumer name
space is restricted for acquiring KEYMSG only, this
gives provides prevention against DoS attacks.
After acquiring KEYMSG the consumer can access
the rest of the segments by using a shared authoritative
name space. The name for each segment includes a
hash digest Hash (KEYMSG), and the object name
is encrypted with a uniquely assigned key Kjl , which
is generated using KEYMSG for each segment l
of an object Oj . For example, the name for seg-
ment s1 of object Oj is given by ”korea.ac.kr/∼
fil/Hash (KEYMSG)/E
j
1 (test.doc/ v1/ s1)”. With
the insertion of Hash (KEYMSG) and encryption of
the naming part with keys generated using KEYMSG,
this naming scheme provides a shared authoritative
name space for all authorized consumers and thus
it enables an effective content caching. Moreover,
this naming scheme ensures the privacy, because the
content name is invisible to outsider without any
knowledge of niS , KEYMSG, and cryptographic keys
KiTS and K
j
l .
Let’s suppose Figure 2(a), a consumer sends an
interest packet IA,i utilizing the proposed naming
scheme. Then, the packet will reach publisher with-
out any cache hit. Let us say that protected con-
tent object Oi is composed of k segments of S =
{S1,i, S2,i . . . Sk,i}; further, the intermediate cache
routers R1 and R2 have the copies of the protected
content segments, represented by SR1,i ⊆ S and
SR2,i ⊆ S. If the consumer is a valid subscriber, the
publisher sends the encryption key generation infor-
mation KEYMSG to the consumer. After receiving the
key generation information, the consumer can decrypt
the content segments, which may be delivered directly
from the intermediate cache router.
IV. SECURE DISTRIBUTION OF PROTECTED
CONTENT
SDPC consists of two protocol suites: 1) the keying
protocol suite and 2) the subscription and content
access protocol suite. The keying protocol suite is
comprised of a key generation protocol and a key
agreement protocol for content protection. Likewise,
the subscription and content access protocol further
includes three protocols, one dealing with the con-
sumer subscription and the other two dealing with
access to the protected contents published by different
publishers.
A. Keying Protocol Suite
In the keying protocol suite, the key generation pro-
tocol generates a commitment key using an irreversible
function similar to the ones used in [22] [23]. The
commitment key is further used to drive multiple keys;
for instance, a chain of content segment encryption
keys, a ticket encryption key, and a consumer associ-
ated symmetric key are derived from the commitment
key.
The key generation mechanism for the content pro-
tection is shown in Figure 3(a). First, the publisher
divides a large content into equal sized segments. For
each protected content object Oj , the publisher gener-
ates a unique commitment key generator by using an
irreversible one-way hash function ζj0 = H (TP , Oj),
where TP is the time of publishing and Oj represents
the content name and version3. After that, the publisher
generates a chain of key generators of the length L =
sizeof(Oj)
segmentsize by using an irreversible one-way function
{H
(
ζj0
)
= ζj1 , H
(
ζj1
)
= ζj2 , . . . ,H
(
ζjl−1
)
= ζjl }.
Each generator ζ in the chain is used by a function
g at a specific index location in the chain to derive
a content segment encryption key. For instance, at
index k, the function g
(
ζjk
)
= H
(
ζjk,Kp
)
generates
the key Kjk used for encrypting the kth segment of
the content object Oj , where Kp is the public key
of the publisher. The use of Kp, in symmetric key
generation process, implicitly ensures the originality
of the content, i.e., the content are still self-certifying
with out use of expensive asymmetric encryption. For
instance, very efficient public key algorithms, such as
ECC [24], are almost three thousand times slower than
symmetric key algorithms [25] such as RC5 [26]. The
symmetric keys generated as a result of the SDPC
keying protocol have the size of 256 bits. Hence, in the
subsequent section on the authentication protocols, any
symmetric encryption algorithms supporting the 256-
bit key can be used, e.g., RC5/6 [26], Rijndael [27],
and Twofish [28].
B. Subscription and Content Access Protocol suite
When a consumer wants to subscribe to the pro-
tected content, the consumer gains an initial access
using a subscription protocol (SubP). After SubP, the
consumer can use a ticket to access multiple protected
contents published by the publishers or managed by a
third party.
1) Initial Access and Subscription Protocol (SubP):
If a consumer Ni wants to subscribe to the protected
content (e.g., subscribing for a movie channel), Ni first
generates an encryption key KiTS = H(K
j
p ⊕ niS),
3Each version of content object is encrypted with a separate chain
of keys. It empowers the publisher to control version-based access.
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Fig. 3. The SDPC protocol suite: (a) symmetric keys generation and admission with reference to segment number of protected content
and (b) message exchange for SubP, APSub, and APSub3.
6
where Kjp is the public key of the publisher and n
i
S is
a secret number shared with the subscription manager
M . SubP continues as follows:
1) As shown in 1 at Figure 3(b), Ni injects a
subscription interest packet Ii and the NDN core
network forwards it to the publisher Pj . The
interest packet encloses ni0 that is encrypted with
the generated encryption key KiTS .
2) Upon receiving the request from Ni, Pj forwards
the request in conjunction with its identity and
the challenge n2 to the subscription manager
M . Note that Pj cannot decrypt the part of the
interest packet which is encrypted with key KiTS
and registration number niS remains invisible to
the publisher.
3) M retrieves the profile of Ni from the database.
If Ni is a legitimate consumer, M gener-
ates the keys KiTS = H(K
j
p ⊕ niS) and
KiS = H
(
TM ⊕ niS
)
, and sends u0 =
EiTS
(
n0 + 1||n1||Tk||Kis
)
to Pj , where TM
is the time of issuing the session key KiS .
The message M3 includes a ticket Tk =
EjP
(
Ni||Kis||profile
)
, a challenge n1 for Ni,
and a challenge response for Pj . After that, Pj
verifies the challenge response and stores n1
to use it as a message authentication in M5
and M6. In addition, Pj retrieves the profile
and the session key Kis from the ticket. Since
ticket is encrypted with the public key of Pj ,
the consumer Ni cannot decrypt it, but can use
it to subscribe to other contents published by Pj ,
without contacting the subscription manager M .
4) Pj forwards u0 to Ni along with KEYMSG =
H
(
ζj0 ,Kp
)
, which is required to decrypt the
segments of the published content and also used
as a content object identifier. After verification
of a challenge (n0 + 1), Ni accepts Tk and
generates a key chain to decrypt the protected
content. The generated key chain involves the
public key of Pj , hence, the content is also self-
certifying.
5) Pj sends the challenge response (n1 + 1) to M
for the confirmation of a successful protocol run.
After challenge (n1 + 1) confirmation, Pj may
optionally register Ni in its own database. If Pj
does not receive any challenge response within
a certain period of time, Pj marks Tk as a stolen
ticket.
In SubP, secure exchanges of n0, n1, and n2 en-
sure the message authentication between the consumer
and the subscription manger, between the subscription
manger and the publisher, and between the publisher
and subscription manger, respectively. Likewise, the
message authentication between the consumer and
publisher is established by the session key encryption
and n1.
C. Content Access Protocols
1) Access Protocol after Subscription (APSub) :
When the consumer Ni wishes to access some other
protected contents published by the publisher Pj , Ni
sends an interest request for the protected content
along with the ticket Tk and APSub continues as
follows.
1) As shown in 2 at Figure 3(b), Ni injects a sub-
scription interest packet, enclosing Accessreq =
EiS (Ni||n0) ||Tk. The NDN core network for-
wards it to the publisher Pj . The publisher
Pj decrypts the ticket and verifies the sender’s
identity Ni by retrieving Kis. If the value Ni
does not match, Pj will ignore the request and
otherwise proceed as follows.
2) Pj sends a challenge response along with the
new challenge encrypted with the session key
Kis. Pj also send KEYMSG, which is required
to decrypt the segments of the published content.
3) Ni sends a challenge response n1. If Pj does not
receive the challenge response within a certain
period of time, Pj marks Tk as a stolen ticket.
In APSub, the secure exchange of ni0 ensures the
message authentication between the consumer and the
publisher.
2) Access Protocol after Subscription involving a
Third Party (APSub3): Assume a consumer Ni sub-
scribed with Pi, which means it shares a session key
Kis with Pi and holds a Tk encrypted with public
key of Pi. Now if Ni wishes to access the protected
contents published by a third-party content publisher
Pj , APSub3 continues as follows.
1) As depicted in 3 at Figure 3(b), Ni injects a sub-
scription interest packet enclosing Accessreq =
EiS (Ni||n0) ||Tk and the packet is forwarded to
the publisher Pj .
2) Upon receiving the request from Ni, Pj forwards
the request in conjunction with its identity and
the challenge n2 to M . Note that Pj cannot
decrypt Accessreq in the interest packet that
is encrypted with the key Kis, which a shared
session key between Ni and Pi, which ensures
the third-party content distributor cannot misuse
the consumer secure information, such as profile
and secret share number.
3) M retrieves the profile from Tk, and if Ni
is a legitimate consumer, M generates the
key KiTS = H(K
j
p ⊕ n0), and sends u0 =
EiS (n0 + 1||n1||KEYMSG) to Pj . The message
M3 also includes the key KiTS , a challenge n1
for Ni, and the challenge response for Pj , which
are encrypted with the public key Pj . After that,
the publisher Pi verifies the challenge response
and stores n1. Note that the ticket is encrypted
with the public key of Pi. Therefore, Ni and
third-party publisher Pj cannot decrypt it. Also,
KEYMSG is inaccessible to Pi, which ensures
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that the third-party content distributor cannot
misuse the protected content.
4) Pj forwards u0||EiTS (Pj) to Ni. After the veri-
fication of the challenge (n0 + 1), Ni generates
KiTS = H(K
j
p ⊕ n0) and sends the challenge
response (n1 + 1) to Pj . Now Ni can generate
a key chain to decrypt the protected published
content. Since the key chain is generated using
the public key of Pi, the content is also self-
certifying.
5) Pj sends the challenge response (n1 + 1) to M
for the confirmation of a successful protocol run.
6) After the challenge confirmation, Pj closes the
protocol run. If Pj does not receive any chal-
lenge response within a certain period of time,
Pj marks Tk as a stolen ticket.
In SubP3, secure exchanges of n0, n1, and n2 en-
sure the message authentication between the consumer
and the subscription manger, between the subscription
manger and the third-party publisher, and between the
third-party publisher and subscription manger, respec-
tively. Likewise, the message authentication between
the consumer and the third-party publisher is estab-
lished by a temporary session key KiTS and n1.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section presents an inclusive security analysis,
formal analysis using BAN logic [29], and Scyther
implementation results [21].
A. Naming based Attacks
In NDN the objects are identified by a human
readable naming system, which can lead to watchlist
and sniffing attacks [30]–[32].
In watchlist, an attacker who has control over
communication links and cache routers, can delete or
filter the content based on a predefined list of content
objects. With the use of SDPC, the content is encrypted
and invisible to the attacker. Recall that in NDN it
is not obligation that a content object must carry an
explicit content name, rather it can carry an implicit
content identifier computed from the corresponding in-
terest. This solution hides the object from the attacker.
Let us reconsider the example in Figure 2(b). The
first interest packet carries the name ”korea.ac.kr/∼fil/
Hash(
(
niS
)
/ EiTS (test.doc/ v1/ s0))” beside the
insertion of hash digest hash(
(
niS
)
, the object name
is encrypted with KiTS . After acquiring KEYMSG
the name for s1 is then given by ”korea.ac.kr/∼fil/
Hash (KEYMSG) / E
j
1 (test.doc/ v1/ s1)”. The at-
tacker cannot get KEYMSG, niS , K
i
TS , and K
j
l , and
thus launching watchlist attack is not possible. More-
over, it completely hides the object name from the
attacker, which ensures the privacy of the consumer.
Contrarily, in a sniffing attack the intruder does not
have any list of pre-defined contents, rather it monitors
the network and filters or eliminates the data if it
contains some specified keywords. Such sniffing attack
is not possible in SDPC, because the data is encrypted
with the secret keys.
B. DDoS Attacks
The in-network caching makes NDN intrinsically
resilient against distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks [33], [34]. DDoS is a malicious attempt to
disturb normal traffic to a server, for instance, multiple
compromised systems send fake interest packets to a
content publisher. Once the content is disseminated
across network caches, the DDoS attack against a pub-
lisher depletes due to the on-path cache hits. However,
assume somehow an attacker manages to flood all
interests to a targeted publisher. With the use of SDPC,
the total burden after a successful DDoS attack on
the targeted publisher will remain insignificant. This is
because the subscription manager M keeps the record
of registered nodes in the hash table, which entries
represent KiTS = H(K
j
p ⊕ n0) session keys. Thus, in
case of suspicion, the subscription manger in SDPC
can identify fake requests by a hash table lookup with
the complexity O (1).
C. Time Analysis Attack
In NDN any cache node can store content segments.
An intruder can guess that a particular content was
requested by a user in particular vicinity by observing
the request response time of a cached or uncached
content. With the use of SDPC the payload is en-
crypted with one of the key derived from KEYMSG
and the name of an object is identified by the digest
and encrypted fields. Since the intruder cannot acquire
KEYMSG on time, it cannot create a valid request to
launch a time analysis attack.
D. Unauthorized Access
SDPC allows the caches to store encrypted contents
and to use a naming scheme unrecognizable to in-
truders. An intruder can access the content only after
acquiring KEYMSG. Since the delivery of KEYMSG
in SDPC is achieved by handshake messages, where
each message exchange contains an explicate (nonce
challenge) or implicit (encryption key derived from
nonce) message authentication; further each message is
encrypted with KiTS = H(K
j
p⊕n0), for unauthorized
access an intruder needs to acquire KiTS .
E. Traffic Monitoring Attack
In traffic monitoring attack [35], an intruder targets
a consumer and tries to identity the requested contents.
To launch a traffic monitoring attack the intruder takes
control of edge router and observes all the requests
send by the target consumer. However, in SDPC the
content name is encrypted, which hides the object
name from the attacker, consequently the traffic moni-
toring cannot reveal the identity of requested contents.
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TABLE I
SCYTHER TOOL PARAMETER SETTINGS.
Parameter Settings
Number of runs 1 to 3
Matching type Find all types of flaws
Search pruning Find all attacks
Number of patterns per claim 10
F. Formal Analysis using BAN Logic
BAN logic [29] is widely used for the formal
analysis of security protocols, till recently [38] [39]
. To verify the security of the SDPC protocol suite, it
is sufficient to demonstrate the security of SubP since
the rest protocols are extensions of SubP. The BAN
logic analysis shows that SDPC is safe against large
number of attacks. A detailed formal analysis of SDPC
using BAN logic can be found in Appendix-I or at [40]
.
G. Scyther Implementation Results
Although BAN logic provides a foundation for the
formal analysis of security protocols, a few attacks can
be undetectable even with BAN logic [36]. However,
the critical analysis of BAN-logic in [36] is based
on usage of asymmetric cryptography, whereas SDPC
utilizes symmetric cryptography. Furthermore, [36]
argue that BAN-logic methodology is faulty because it
is assumed that physical security and administration do
not suffer from the loss of messages by the underlying
communication facility or because of host crashes.
Owing to replication of contents across the network,
in ICN this assumption has minor effect. Still, for
the additional proof of the strength of the SDPC
protocol suite, we implemented SDPC, EU-RE [18],
and MCAC [17] in an automated security protocol
analysis tool, Scyther [21].
We considered four claims: 1) aliveness, 2) weak
agreement, 3) non-injective agreement, and 4) non-
injective synchronization [20]. These four claims are
proven to be true for SDPC by using BAN logic. In
Scyther, a protocol is modeled as an exchange of mes-
sages among different participating roles. For instance,
in NDN-SDPC, the consumer and publisher are in the
roles of initiator (I) and responder (R), respectively,
whereas the subscription manger is in the role of a
server (S). In EU-RE, the publisher acts both as a
responder and as a server (R S), whereas in MCAC
the consumer and publisher are in the roles of I and
R, respectively, whereas the 3rd party authenticator
has the role of S. The Scyther tool integrates the
authentication properties into the protocol specification
as a claim event. We tested SDPC, MCAC, and EU-
RE by employing the claims mentioned earlier, with
the parameter settings given in Table I.
The Scyther results are shown in Table II. It is
clear that SubP qualifies all of the protocol claims
and no attacks were found. Consequently, for a large
number of systems and scenarios, SDPC guarantees
safety against a large number of known attacks such
as impersonating, man-in-middle, and replay attacks.
However, in EU-RE, the author made an assumption
that the content provider behaves correctly, i.e., it does
not distribute any private contents or decryption rights
to unauthorized users, this assumption falsifies the
protocol claims, which means EU-RE is weak against
several attacks. The Scyther implementation shows that
initiator fails to confirm claims 2, 3, and 4.
In MCAC, the TCB along with encrypted communi-
cation between routers provide strong security against
man-in-middle attack; however, during the bootstrap-
ping, the session key establishment is conducted by
the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key distribution algorithm
[37] without using a proper authentication procedure.
Since the DH algorithm does not inherently provide
authentication, it can be secure only if it is properly
integrated with another authentication protocol. This
weak link in MCAC makes it vulnerable to several
attacks, even a man-in-middle attack could be possible
if an intruder tempered the session key distribution
procedure during bootstrapping process. Therefore,
from Scyther implementation results, it can be seen
that MCAC fails to qualify a signal claim; further, if
we assume the DH key exchange protocol is integrated
with an authentication protocol or bootstrap process
is hidden from the intruder, then MCAC qualifies all
the claims. The inclusion of the authentication process
causes the extra processing burden only during the
bootstrap process and can be ignored for the next steps
in the protocol.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We consider a scale-free network of 200 cache
nodes generated using the BarabsiAlbert (BA) model,
as shown in Figure 4, which connects the publisher
and the consumer space. Each cache router has a static
request routing table. Further, we assume five content
publishers in the network. Each publisher has 100,000
secure content items, and a Zipf-distribution with a
popularity distribution exponent α = 0.7 is used to
determine the population of content items in the entire
network.
To ensure quick dissemination of the contents in
the network, the publishers are connected to the cache
routers with the highest betweenness centrality score,
it helps to bringing system in steady state in short
time. Furthermore, 25 gateway cache routers are con-
nected to the consumer space with a large number of
consumers. At any given time, 400 500 consumers are
subscribed with each publisher and thus the total num-
ber of consumers subscribed to five publishers varies
between 2,000 and 2,500. The size of each content
item is 1GB, which is divided into 10 segments, and
the link capacity between two cache routers is 1 Gbps,
Finally, least frequently and recently used (LFRU) [7]
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TABLE II
SCYTHER RESULTS FOR SDPC, MCAC, AND EU-RE.
Claims MCAC [17] MCAC [17]auth. EU-RE [18] NDN-SDPC
I R S I R S I RS I R S
Aliveness N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Weak Agreement N N N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Non-injective Agreement N N N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Non-injective Synchronization N N N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
N = Protocol claim is not fulfilled; Y = Protocol claim is fulfilled
Fig. 4. Network setup for performance evaluation.
is used in the experiment as a content replacement
scheme.
We implemented the network setup, as described
above, in MATLAB and compared the performance of
NDN-SDPC against MCAC, EU-RE, and native NDN
for two scenarios, 1) using end-to-end encryption,
which makes the caching ineffective, as discussed in
Figure 1, and 2) enabling the caching with a con-
ventional way of a shared group key [8] [9]. In the
scenario 2, the shared group key enables in-network
caching, but the shared group key is unfeasible be-
cause the authorized consumers need to keep a large
number of keys for effective cache utilization in highly
dynamic environments. Moreover, extra decision op-
erations are required to select a proper key and to
determine the timing of key deletion. For simplicity,
in the scenario 2, we only consider the computational
and message complexity required to ensure backward
and forward secrecy. The processing required to select
an appropriate key on the consumer side is ignored.
Further, the scenario 2 is simulated for different levels
of dynamicity in the consumer space, by considering
5, 15, and 25 leave and join requests per unit time;
representing cases 1, 2, and 3, respectively. This com-
Fig. 5. Average download delay at gateway-cache router.
parison is made in terms of average download time4,
publisher load5, and timeout interest ratio6.
Figure 5 shows the comparison of the average
download time observed when each of the 25 gateway
cache routers receives the requests that are generated
by a Poisson distribution with a rate λdj = 100 req/s.
The results are considered for different cache sizes of
200 MB to 100 GB; further, in case of MCAC, it is
considered that 20% of contents are labelled as the
h-level and 80% as the d-level.7 From Figure 5, it
4The average download time is defined as the ratio of the total
number of requests observed on all 25 cache routers to the time
taken to receive all the requested contents at the gateway routers.
5The publisher load is defined as the percentage of interests
reached at publisher. High the publisher load implies low cache
hit.
6The timeout interest ratio is defined as the percentage of interests
timed out and re-transmitted.
7The existence of different levels of content impacts the overall
performance of MCAC, as shown in Figure 6.
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Fig. 6. Average download delay for different numbers of h-level
contents.
can be seen that NDN with SDPC outperforms EU-
RE and native NDN both in the scenarios 1 and 2.
The performance of NDN in the scenario 2 degrades
further with the increase in dynamicity of the con-
sumer space. The performance results of EU-RE are
interesting, for smaller cache size [200MB-1GB], the
performance of EU-RE is very close to NDN-SDPC,
and it outperforms native NDN both in the scenarios
1 and 2. However, the performance gap increases with
the increase of the cache size, and it falls down below
NDN in the scenario 2 with case 3. In Eu-RE, the
key revocation and content version are not correlated,
and this can be one of the reason of such performance
degradation. For a large cache size, MCAC performs
better than EU-RE and NDN in scenario 2 with cases
2 and 3; however, NDN-SDPC and NDN in scenario
2 with case 1 outperform the MCAC. As discussed
earlier, MCAC enforces intermediate routers to im-
plement TCB, which includes several operations and
encryption/decryption process for the h-level and the
n-level secure content, these extra operations introduce
processing delay at intermediate routers, the perfor-
mance of MCAC further decreases with increasing the
number of h-level contents.
Figure 6 shows the comparison of average down-
load time comparison between NDN, NDN-SDPC and
MCAC, for different numbers of h-level contents rang-
ing from 0 to 100% of total traffic, with the fixed 1GB
cache size. From Figure 6, it is clear that performance
of MCAC degrades with increasing number of h-
level content. The performance degradation of MCAC
with increasing the number of the h-level contents
is quite obvious, because h-level contents require no
caching policy; hence, all interest packets traverse to
the publisher.
Figure 7 shows the comparison of publisher load.
We considered the case-3 level dynamicity of con-
sumer space for EU-RE, MCAC, and NDN-SDPC.
From Figure 7, it is evident that in NDN-SDPC the
Fig. 7. Publisher load for different cache sizes.
Fig. 8. Timeout interest ratio for different cache sizes.
publisher load is 12 to 20% lower than EU-RE; how-
ever, publisher load at MCAC is almost same as NDN-
SDPC, but MCAC’s load increases with increasing
number of h-level contents. This also implies that
NDN-SDPC has higher cache hit ratio. Similarly, from
Figure 8, it can be seen that EU-RE, NDN-SDPC
and MCAC, with small numbers of h-level contents,
suffer with lower number of time out interest packets.
However, NDN-SDPC and MCAC with 20% of h-level
contents suffer 35 to 50% less than EU-RE; however,
this performance metric also shows that performance
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of MCAC reduces with increasing number of h-level
contents. This also implies that in comparison to EU-
RE and MCAC, the NDN-SDPC provides better cache
diversity.
VII. CONCLUSION
For effective caching and access control of the
protected content in ICN, we proposed a secure dis-
tribution of protected content (SDPC). The SDPC’s
keying protocol suite empowers the publisher and
consumer to generate multiple symmetric encryption
keys with the exchange of a single commitment key.
Moreover, SDPC’s subscription and content access
protocol suite ensures that only authenticated users
can acquire the respective key generation information
for the requested content. Another important aspect of
proposed scheme is the hybrid naming scheme, which
provide privacy protection and deters the time analysis
attack. The commitment key in SDPC is generated
with the publishers public key, along with other secret
credentials, and thus allows the consumer to implicitly
verify the originality of the published content. In other
words, self-certifying is achieved with the symmetric
key cryptography, which makes SDPC free from the
expensive computation overhead problem incurred in
public key algorithms [24]. Consequently, we believe
that the adaptation of SDPC can make NDN more
feasible for resource-limited networks such as Internet
of things (IoT), which is one of our future works.
APPENDIX A
BAN LOGIC ANALYSIS
Three basic objects of BAN logic are principals, for-
mula/statements, and encryption keys. The principals
and the protocol participants are represented by sym-
bols P and Q, respectively. The formula/statements are
symbolized by X and Y , and represents the content
of the message exchanged. The encryption keys are
symbolized by K . The logical notations of BAN-
logic analysis are given in Table III, and Some primary
BAN-logic postulates used in the analysis of SDPC are
summarized in Table IV.
The SubP protocol should achieve the following
four goals that state that both the consumer and the
publisher trust the encryption key KiS for the secure
exchange of KEYMSG:
• G1: Pj |=
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)
• G2:Ni |=
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)
• G3: Pj |= Ni |=
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)
• G4:Ni |= Pj |=
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)
To verify the above-mentioned goals, the first step of
BAN logic is to convert the subject protocol in its ide-
alized form. The idealization is a process to represent
TABLE III
LOGICAL NOTATIONS OF BAN-LOGIC.
Notation Description
P |= X P believes X , or P would be enabled to believe
X; in conclusion, P can take X as true.
P <· X P received a message X and P can see the contentsof the message and is capable of repeating X
P | ∼ X P has sent a message including the statement X .However, the freshness of message is unknown.
P =⇒ X P controls X and should be trusted for for-mula/statement X .
#(X) X is fresh, i.e., X never sent by any principal before.
P
k↔ Q P and Q shares a key K for secure communicationsand K is only known to P , Q.
(X)K The statement X is encrypted by key K.
(X)Y
It stand for X combined with Y . Y is anticipated to
be secret and its implicit or explicit presence proves
the identity of a principal who completes (X)Y .
TABLE IV
PRIMARY BAN-LOGIC POSTULATES.
Rule Postulate
Message meaning rules
P |=P K←→Q,P<·(X)K
P |=Q|∼X ,
P |=P Y←→Q,P<·{X}Y
P |=Q|∼X
Nonce verification rule P |=#(X),P |=Q|∼X
P |=Q|=X
Jurisdiction rule P |=Q⇒X,P |=Q|=X
P |=X
Freshness rule P |=#(X)
P |=(X,Y )
Believe rule P |=Q|=(X,Y )
P |=X,P |=Y
Session key rule
P |=Q#(X),P |=Q|=X
P |=P K←→Q
each message exchange in its intended semantics. In
other words, the idealization is a process of converting
each message exchange into a logical formula by using
BAN symbols and notations. The idealizations of SubP
are given below.
• M1: Ni
V ia Pj←−−−→ M :{(
n0, Ni
niS↔M
)}
KiTS=H(K
j
p⊕niS)
• M2: Pj →M : {n2, IDPj}
• M3:
M → Pj :{[
n1, n2,
(
profile, Ni, Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj ,
#
(
Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj
))
KjP
]
KjP
,
[
n0, n1,
(
profile, Ni,
Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj ,#
(
Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj
))
KjP
, Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj ,
#
(
Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj
)
, Ni
niS←−→M
]
KiTS=H(K
j
P⊕niS)
}
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• M4:
Pj
V iaM←−−−→ Ni :{[
n0, n1,
(
profile, Ni,
Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj ,#
(
Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj
))
KjP
, Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj ,
#
(
Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj
)
, Ni
niS←−→M
]
KiTS=H(K
j
P⊕niS)
,[〈
ζj0 ,Kp
〉
, Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj ,
#
(
Ni(
KiS←−→)Pj
)
, Ni
niS←−→M
]
KiTS=H(K
j
P⊕niS)
}
• M5:Pj →M : (n1)KiS
• M6:Ni → Pj : (n1)KiS
In an idealized protocol narration of SubP, the
messages clearly show all the assertions. Using these
assertions, all the implicit assumptions can be explicit.
Then, the initial assumptions of SubP are given below.
• A1:M |= #(n0)
• A2:M |= #(n2)
• A3: Pj |= #(n1)
• A4: Ni |= #(n1)
• A5: Ni |=
(
Ni
KiTS=H(K
j
p⊕niS)←−−−−−−−−−−→M
)
• A6: M |=
(
Ni
KiTS=H(K
j
p⊕niS)←−−−−−−−−−−→M
)
• A7:Pj |=
(
Pj
KjP↔M
)
• A8:M |=
(
Pj
KjP↔M
)
• A9: M |= Ni |=
(
Ni
KiTS=H(K
j
p⊕niS)←−−−−−−−−−−→M
)
• A10: Ni |=M |=
(
Ni
KiTS=H(K
j
p⊕niS)←−−−−−−−−−−→M
)
• A11: M |= Pj |=
(
Pj
KjP↔M
)
• A12: Pj |=M |=
(
Pj
KjP↔M
)
Let us analyze SDPC to show that Ni and Pj share
a session key. From M1, we have
M <·
{
n0,
(
Ni
niS↔M
)}
KiTS=H(K
j
p⊕niS)
. (1)
A6 and the message meaning rule infer that
M |= Ni |∼
{
n0,
(
Ni
niS↔M
)}
. (2)
A1 and the freshness conjuncatenation comprehend
that
M |= #
{
n0,
(
Ni
niS↔M
)}
. (3)
Also, (2), (3), and the nonce verification rule deduce
that
M |=
{
Ni |= niS , n0,
(
Ni
niS↔M
)}
. (4)
Then, (4) and the believe rule infer that
M |= Ni |=
(
Ni
niS↔M
)
. (5)
From A2, (5), and the jurisdiction rule, it can be
concluded
M |=
(
Ni
niS↔M
)
. (6)
This belief confirms that M has received a message
from a legitimate Ni. A2, A1, (3), and the freshness
conjuncatenation comprehend that
M |= #
{
n0, n2,
(
Ni
niS↔M
)}
. (7)
According to the nonce freshness, (7) proves that
M confirmed that Ni is recently alive and running the
protocol. Further, from (4) and (7), M has guaranteed
that the Ni has been running the protocol, apparently
with M . This also proves that M and Ni agree on the
nonce values corresponding to all the nonce in M1 and
M2. These three proven claims are known as aliveness,
weak agreement, and non-injective agreement and de-
fined in [20], [21].
From M3, we have
Pj <·
(
n1, n2,
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj ,#
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)
, ni0
)
KjP
)
KjP
.
(8)
A7, (8), and n2 nonce verification rule deduce that
Pj |=M |∼
{
n1, n
i
0, Ni
KiS↔ Pj ,#
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)}
.
(9)
In addition, A3, (9), and the freshness conjuncatena-
tion comprehend that
Pj |= #
{
n1, n
i
0, Ni
KiS↔ Pj ,#
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)}
. (10)
(9), (10), and the nonce verification rule infer that
Pj |=M |=
{
n1, n
i
0, Ni
KiS↔ Pj ,#
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)}
.
(11)
(11) and the believe rule comprehend that
Pj |=M |=
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)
. (12)
The logic belief proves that Pj is confident and
believes that KiS is issued by M ; moreover, the
freshness of the key from (10) also suggests that M
is alive and running the protocol with Pj and Ni.
Further, from (9), (10), and (11), Pj has guaranteed
that M has been running the protocol, apparently with
Pj . This also proves that M and Pj are also agree on
the nonce values corresponding to all the nonce in M3.
This concludes that M and Pj also satisfy the liveness,
weak agreement, and non-injective agreement. Conse-
quently, (11), (12), and the jurisdiction rule conclude
G1, i.e.,
Pj |=
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)
. (13)
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From M4, we have
Ni <·
{
n1, Ni
KiS↔ Pj ,#
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)
, Ni
niS↔M
}
KiTS=H(K
j
p⊕niS)
.
(14)
(14), A5, and the message meaning rule comprehend
that
Ni |=M |∼
{
n1, Ni
KiS↔ Pj ,#
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)}
. (15)
Then, (Eq15), A4, and the freshness conjuncatenation
rule infer that
Ni |= #
{
n1, Ni
KiS↔ Pj ,#
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)}
. (16)
(15), (16), and the nonce verification rule deduce that
Ni |=M |=
{
n1, , Ni
KiS↔ Pj ,#
(
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
)}
. (17)
Then, (17) and the believe rule infer that
Ni |=M |=
{
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
}
. (18)
The logic belief proves that Ni is confident and
believes that KiS is issued by M ; moreover, the
freshness of the key from (16) also suggests that M
is alive and running the protocol with Ni. Further,
from (15), (16) and (17), Ni has guaranteed that
M has been running the protocol, apparently with
Ni and Pj . This also proves that M and Ni are
also agree on the nonce values corresponding to all
the nonce in M4. This concludes that M and Ni
also satisfies the liveness, weak agreement, and non-
injective agreement. Conseuqently, (17), (18) and the
jurisdiction rule conclude G2, i.e.,
Ni |=
{
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
}
. (19)
From M5, we have
Ni <· IDSj . (20)
(13), (19), (20), and the meaning rule comprehend G3,
i.e.,
Pj |= Ni |=
{
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
}
. (21)
From M6, we have
Pj <· n1. (22)
(13), (19), (21) and nonce verification rule deduce G4
of
Ni |= Pj |=
{
Ni
KiS↔ Pj
}
. (23)
The logic belief proves that Ni is confident and Pj
also believes that KiS is issued by M . Moreover, (5),
(11), and (17) prove that all communicating partners
are confident that their communication partners exactly
follow their roles in the protocol and exchange the
intended messages in the intended order. This proven
claim is known as non-injective synchronization and
defined in [20].
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